All Systems Operational
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Uptime over the past 90 days. View historical uptime.
Git Operations
Operational
Webhooks
Operational
Visit www.githubstatus.com for more information
Operational
API Requests
Operational
Issues
Operational
Pull Requests
Operational
Actions
Operational
Packages
Operational
Pages
Operational
Copilot
Operational
Codespaces
Operational
Copilot AI Model Providers
Operational
Operational
Degraded Performance
Partial Outage
Major Outage
Maintenance
Major outage
Partial outage
No downtime recorded on this day.
No data exists for this day.
had a major outage.
had a partial outage.
Related
No incidents or maintenance related to this downtime.
Past Incidents
Oct 12, 2026
Resolved -
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Oct 12, 20:16 UTC
Oct 12, 20:16 UTC
Update -
Web and email notifications will be delayed for 1 more hour as we are close to completing the backlog of notifications.
Oct 12, 19:28 UTC
Oct 12, 19:28 UTC
Update -
Web and email notifications continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog of notifications.
Oct 12, 17:34 UTC
Oct 12, 17:34 UTC
Update -
Notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog.
Oct 12, 15:50 UTC
Oct 12, 15:50 UTC
Update -
We have successfully applied a mitigation for notifications, and notifications have resumed but will continue to be delayed as we work through a backlog.
Oct 12, 15:19 UTC
Oct 12, 15:19 UTC
Update -
We have mitigated the issues with Actions, issues, and projects, and have a mitigation in progress to address the delay with notifications.
Oct 12, 14:37 UTC
Oct 12, 14:37 UTC
Update -
The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 12, 14:36 UTC
Oct 12, 14:36 UTC
Update -
The degradation affecting Issues has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 12, 14:35 UTC
Oct 12, 14:35 UTC
Update -
Our initial mitigation was not fully successful, and users may still experience delays and errors with Actions, issues and projects, and notifications are delayed. We're continuing to investigate the root cause and work on additional mitigations.
Oct 12, 13:38 UTC
Oct 12, 13:38 UTC
Update -
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Oct 12, 13:02 UTC
Oct 12, 13:02 UTC
Update -
We have a mitigation in progress and are monitoring for recovery. Users may also experience delayed web notifications as we mitigate.
Oct 12, 12:57 UTC
Oct 12, 12:57 UTC
Update -
Users may experience issues loading the Actions tab UI, interacting with the Checks API, queueing new Actions runs, creating and updating issues, and requesting PR reviews, including via REST and GraphQL APIs.
Oct 12, 12:33 UTC
Oct 12, 12:33 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Issues and Pull Requests
Oct 12, 12:21 UTC
Oct 12, 12:21 UTC
Oct 11, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 10, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 9, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 8, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 7, 2026
Resolved -
On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7
Oct 7, 18:04 UTC
Oct 7, 18:04 UTC
Update -
All systems have recovered. We have applied mitigations and do not anticipate another recurrence.
Oct 7, 18:00 UTC
Oct 7, 18:00 UTC
Monitoring -
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 17:27 UTC
Oct 7, 17:27 UTC
Update -
We observed widespread impact across GitHub services from 16:52 UTC to 17:01 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. All systems have recovered. This incident is a reoccurrence of the incident from earlier in the day https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7. Durable mitigation is in progress. We will provide another update in 30 minutes.
Oct 7, 17:25 UTC
Oct 7, 17:25 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions, Git Operations, Issues and Pull Requests
Oct 7, 17:17 UTC
Oct 7, 17:17 UTC
Resolved -
On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected.
In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded.
GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers.
Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure.
To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds.
We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.
Oct 7, 16:25 UTC
In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded.
GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers.
Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure.
To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds.
We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.
Oct 7, 16:25 UTC
Update -
Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions are fully recovered and stable. The root cause has been identified and mitigations are being applied to prevent a reoccurrence.
Oct 7, 16:23 UTC
Oct 7, 16:23 UTC
Update -
We are seeing full recovery across all systems including Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions. We are continuing to investigate the root cause of the disruption between 15:06 UTC and 15:16 UTC, and will share another update shortly.
Oct 7, 15:58 UTC
Oct 7, 15:58 UTC
Update -
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 15:56 UTC
Oct 7, 15:56 UTC
Monitoring -
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 15:49 UTC
Oct 7, 15:49 UTC
Update -
The degradation affecting Git Operations and Webhooks has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 15:49 UTC
Oct 7, 15:49 UTC
Update -
The degradation affecting Issues has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 15:47 UTC
Oct 7, 15:47 UTC
Update -
We are observing partial recovery across all systems. We are continuing to monitor and investigate the root cause of the disruption.
Oct 7, 15:41 UTC
Oct 7, 15:41 UTC
Update -
Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:35 UTC
Oct 7, 15:35 UTC
Update -
Actions is operating normally.
Oct 7, 15:32 UTC
Oct 7, 15:32 UTC
Update -
The degradation affecting Pull Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 7, 15:31 UTC
Oct 7, 15:31 UTC
Update -
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:27 UTC
Oct 7, 15:27 UTC
Update -
Git Operations is operating normally.
Oct 7, 15:27 UTC
Oct 7, 15:27 UTC
Update -
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:25 UTC
Oct 7, 15:25 UTC
Update -
We observed widespread impact across GitHub services between 15:06 UTC and 15:16 UTC, and are investigating the root cause. We are seeing all systems recover, and will provide another update shortly.
Oct 7, 15:24 UTC
Oct 7, 15:24 UTC
Update -
Git Operations is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:21 UTC
Oct 7, 15:21 UTC
Update -
Webhooks is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:16 UTC
Oct 7, 15:16 UTC
Update -
Issues is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:15 UTC
Oct 7, 15:15 UTC
Update -
Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 7, 15:14 UTC
Oct 7, 15:14 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions, Git Operations and Pull Requests
Oct 7, 15:14 UTC
Oct 7, 15:14 UTC
Oct 6, 2026
Resolved -
On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged.
We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.
Oct 6, 23:40 UTC
We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.
Oct 6, 23:40 UTC
Update -
We are deploying a mitigation and plan to resume migrations shortly thereafter
Oct 6, 22:40 UTC
Oct 6, 22:40 UTC
Update -
We are working towards a mitigation that will allow us to resume processing enterprise migrations.
Oct 6, 21:29 UTC
Oct 6, 21:29 UTC
Investigating -
All services are functioning normally except for enterprise migrations, which are still paused. They will resume soon.
Oct 6, 20:57 UTC
Oct 6, 20:57 UTC
Monitoring -
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 6, 20:26 UTC
Oct 6, 20:26 UTC
Update -
A number of services including issues, pull requests, and webhooks, were briefly degraded, but have now recovered. Enterprise migrations are paused while we validate causes and mitigations.
Oct 6, 20:22 UTC
Oct 6, 20:22 UTC
Update -
Pull Requests is operating normally.
Oct 6, 20:12 UTC
Oct 6, 20:12 UTC
Update -
Webhooks is operating normally.
Oct 6, 20:04 UTC
Oct 6, 20:04 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Pull Requests and Webhooks
Oct 6, 19:57 UTC
Oct 6, 19:57 UTC
Resolved -
On October 5, 2026, between 23:05 UTC and 00:11 UTC on October 6, some users experienced slow page loads, timeouts, and errors when accessing organization and enterprise billing, licensing, and settings pages. On average, the error rate was 1.9% and peaked at 13.8% of requests to the service that powers these pages.
This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region.
We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.
Oct 6, 01:32 UTC
This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region.
We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.
Oct 6, 01:32 UTC
Update -
Users may experience issues accessing organization and enterprise billing and licensing pages. We are deploying a mitigation and monitoring for recovery.
Oct 6, 00:05 UTC
Oct 6, 00:05 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Oct 5, 23:47 UTC
Oct 5, 23:47 UTC
Oct 5, 2026
Resolved -
On October 5, 2026, between 18:48 and 22:49 UTC, GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners experienced degraded performance. Over the full incident, 14.3% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners and 26.5% of individual GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes.
During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected.
The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services.
We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC.
We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents.
Oct 5, 22:49 UTC
During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected.
The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services.
We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC.
We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents.
Oct 5, 22:49 UTC
Update -
Pages is operating normally.
Oct 5, 22:40 UTC
Oct 5, 22:40 UTC
Update -
Actions is operating normally.
Oct 5, 21:54 UTC
Oct 5, 21:54 UTC
Update -
We have applied mitigations to address GitHub Actions failures. Queued jobs are clearing, new jobs are not delayed, and we expect full runner recovery shortly. We continue to monitor for full recovery and are working to mitigate ongoing issues affecting other services, including access to repository lists, licensing, and billing pages.
Oct 5, 21:32 UTC
Oct 5, 21:32 UTC
Update -
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 5, 21:31 UTC
Oct 5, 21:31 UTC
Update -
Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 5, 21:22 UTC
Oct 5, 21:22 UTC
Update -
In addition to ongoing issues with Actions and Hosted Runners, some customers are also unable to access repository list, licensing and billing pages within their GitHub accounts. We continue to investigate and are working on mitigation.
Oct 5, 21:09 UTC
Oct 5, 21:09 UTC
Update -
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 5, 20:47 UTC
Oct 5, 20:47 UTC
Update -
We’re continuing to investigate job failures and delays affecting GitHub-hosted runner assignment and workflow start times. Our teams are actively working to mitigate the impact and will provide another update as we learn more.
Oct 5, 20:39 UTC
Oct 5, 20:39 UTC
Update -
We’re still investigating delays in assigning GitHub-hosted runners, affecting workflow start times across multiple runner configurations. Our teams are working to mitigate the impact; we’ll share another update as we learn more.
Oct 5, 19:50 UTC
Oct 5, 19:50 UTC
Update -
We’re investigating an issue causing delays when assigning GitHub-hosted runners to Actions jobs. Some workflows may take longer to start across runner configurations. Our teams are working to mitigate the issue, and we’ll provide an update as we learn more.
Oct 5, 19:15 UTC
Oct 5, 19:15 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Oct 5, 19:11 UTC
Oct 5, 19:11 UTC
Oct 4, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 3, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 2, 2026
No incidents reported.
Oct 1, 2026
Resolved -
On October 1, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two periods of delayed and failed job starts on GitHub-hosted runners, beginning at approximately 14:15 UTC. Across the 14:15–17:56 UTC incident-response window, approximately 0.68% of workflow runs experienced start delays, and 0.196% of jobs failed to start.
A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available.
During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC.
Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions.
Oct 1, 17:56 UTC
A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available.
During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC.
Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions.
Oct 1, 17:56 UTC
Update -
GitHub Actions experienced degraded performance for some hosted runners due to throttling within an upstream Azure dependency. Service capacity has recovered, and we are continuing to monitor while working with Azure on the underlying condition.
Oct 1, 17:50 UTC
Oct 1, 17:50 UTC
Update -
We are currently applying a mitigation and anticipate recovery within thirty minutes.
Oct 1, 16:48 UTC
Oct 1, 16:48 UTC
Update -
We have identified an issue with our upstream provider which is causing Actions requests to 429 which is creating the delays. We have escalated to the owning team and are investigating how to mitigate the 429s.
Oct 1, 16:10 UTC
Oct 1, 16:10 UTC
Update -
We are seeing a reoccurrence in run-start delays, and are continuing to investigate to issue. Customers will potentially experience delays of up to ten minutes.
Oct 1, 15:29 UTC
Oct 1, 15:29 UTC
Investigating -
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
Oct 1, 15:20 UTC
Oct 1, 15:20 UTC
Monitoring -
The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 1, 15:10 UTC
Oct 1, 15:10 UTC
Update -
Run-start delays on Ubuntu runners have been resolved. We are investigating run-start delays on Windows runners and will share more information as it becomes available.
Oct 1, 15:02 UTC
Oct 1, 15:02 UTC
Update -
We have identified the cause of increased Actions run start delays on Ubuntu runners and are actively deploying a fix. Customers may continue to experience intermittent delays while the mitigation rolls out and service metrics return to normal.
Oct 1, 14:54 UTC
Oct 1, 14:54 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions
Oct 1, 14:47 UTC
Oct 1, 14:47 UTC
Resolved -
On October 1, 2026, between 13:04 UTC and 13:34 UTC, users experienced two periods of slow page loads and intermittent request failures on GitHub.com. On average, the error rate was 0.52% and peaked at 6.13%. An unusually high volume of incoming traffic placed additional load on our traffic-handling infrastructure, delaying requests before they reached our application servers. Performance returned to normal as the traffic subsided, and we have since applied additional traffic filtering to protect against similar traffic. We are improving alerting for delays in our traffic-handling infrastructure and strengthening our automated traffic protections to reduce our time to detection and mitigation.
Oct 1, 13:57 UTC
Oct 1, 13:57 UTC
Monitoring -
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
Oct 1, 13:51 UTC
Oct 1, 13:51 UTC
Update -
We are investigating recurrent periods of elevated latency affecting web requests. We’ll share updates as more information becomes available.
Oct 1, 13:39 UTC
Oct 1, 13:39 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Oct 1, 13:37 UTC
Oct 1, 13:37 UTC
Resolved -
On October 1, around 02:00 UTC, an isolated infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to lose execution state for a small number of existing workflow runs. Affected runs may remain stuck, fail deployment approvals, or return errors when cancelled. Service connectivity has recovered, but the lost state cannot be restored by retrying an approval.
If you're affected, you can trigger a new run or contact GitHub Support with links to your stuck runs so we can unblock them. Once cleared, select "Re-run all jobs." This preserves the workflow run ID but starts a new attempt, rebuilds artifacts, and requires fresh deployment approvals. Before rerunning, check whether any deployment steps already completed to avoid repeating changes.
Oct 1, 02:00 UTC
If you're affected, you can trigger a new run or contact GitHub Support with links to your stuck runs so we can unblock them. Once cleared, select "Re-run all jobs." This preserves the workflow run ID but starts a new attempt, rebuilds artifacts, and requires fresh deployment approvals. Before rerunning, check whether any deployment steps already completed to avoid repeating changes.
Oct 1, 02:00 UTC
Sep 30, 2026
No incidents reported.
Sep 29, 2026
No incidents reported.
Sep 28, 2026
Resolved -
On September 28, 2026, between 19:23 UTC and 22:08 UTC the Copilot Code Review service was degraded and pull request reviews did not complete in all environments. On average, approximately 70% of requested reviews did not complete. Reviews requested during this window were not automatically retried, and users needed to re-request a review from their pull request. This was due to a change in a dependent service that stopped delivering data Copilot Code Review needs to complete a review. Review completion is an inherently delayed signal, because each review job takes time to start and finish, so it took longer to detect the impact.
We mitigated the incident by reverting the change.
We are working to add a faster signal for reviews that fail to complete, add deployment validation that confirms a Copilot Code Review completes end to end, improve how we track internal dependencies between services, and make our deployment pipeline more reliable to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Sep 28, 22:08 UTC
We mitigated the incident by reverting the change.
We are working to add a faster signal for reviews that fail to complete, add deployment validation that confirms a Copilot Code Review completes end to end, improve how we track internal dependencies between services, and make our deployment pipeline more reliable to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
Sep 28, 22:08 UTC
Update -
Copilot Code review has recovered, for reviews that were previously not successful you can re-request review from your PR.
Sep 28, 22:08 UTC
Sep 28, 22:08 UTC
Update -
Revert of the impacted change is in flight, expect full recovery once the deployment is done.
Sep 28, 21:23 UTC
Sep 28, 21:23 UTC
Investigating -
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
Sep 28, 21:16 UTC
Sep 28, 21:16 UTC
